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Public policies are continuously sought which will assist in guiding the economy between
the perils of inflation and the dangers of unemployment and under-production. During the
last five years the perils of inflation have become increasingly apparent, and during the past
year stabilization actions have been taken to reduce the rate of advance of the price level. At
the present time there is growing concern that these actions may lead the economy into a
recession,
What are the vehicles and avenues of stabilization policy which can best restore the econ-
oniy to a satisfactory course, that is, a high and rising level of output and employment with
a reasonably stable price level? Unfortunately, students of this problem are not in ~ubstan-
tial agreement on an answer. Economists have tended to fall into two conflicting schools of
thought regarding economic stabilization — the income-expenditure approach and the modern
quantity theory of money approach.
Until recently, the dominant school has been the modern version of the income-expendi-
ture theory which has evolved from the work of John Maynard Keynes in the 1930’s. Policy-
makers in the 1950’s and 1960’s generally adopted the theoretical framework of this school
for the formulation of economic stabilization actions. Primary emphasis was given to fiscal
actions — Federal government spending and taxing programs — in guiding the economy be-
tween inflation and unemployment. During the last two decades, proponents of the modern
quantity theory of money have increasingly challenged the basic propositions of the income-
expenditure school. The modern quantity theory assigns to the money stock the major role
in economic stabilization efforts.
The following paper by David i. Fand, Professor of Economics, Wayne State University,
outlines the nature of some of the major points of disagreement between the income-expendi-
ture approach to stabilization policy and the modern quantity theory approach. This paper
was presented to a seminar of college and university professors of money and banking
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis on November 7, 1969. This paper has
appeared in BANcA NAZIONALE Da LAvoRo QUARTERLY REvIEw, No. 90, September 1969.
in brief summary, Professor Fand analyzes the following four points of disagreement
between proponents of the income-expenditure school and the modern quantity theory school:
(1) The modern quantity theory of money espouses the view that the Federal Reserve
System can exercise close control over the nominal money stock. On the other hand,
proponents of the income-expenditure school have questioned either the feasibility
or desirability of such control.
(2) Economic analysis based on the income-expenditure approach usually assumes a con-
stant price level, thereby abstracting from the distinction between nominal and real
money balances and between market interest rates and real interest rates. Modern
quantity theory advocates maintain that this failure to take into consideration the
distinction between nominal and real magnitudes has frequently led to erroneous
stabilization policies in recent -years.
(3) The two schools have very different views regarding the causes of inflation. The 1modern quantity theory stresses the influence of changes in the money stock on ag-
gregate demand in explaining movements in the price level, while the income-
expenditure theory has stressed factors which influence aggregate supply, such as
wage movements and other influences on costs of production.
(4) Finally, Professor Fand compares the special assumptions of the income-expenditure
school, which led them to conclude that fiscal actions have a great influence on total
spending, with those of the modern quantity school, which lead to the opposite con-
clusion. He points out that most discussions of the influence of fiscal actions on
total spending implicitly assume that interest rates are held constant by accommo-
dative changes in the money stock. On the other hand, in discussing the influence
of fiscal actions, proponents of the modern quantity theory of money assume that
the money stock is held constant, which results in an offsetting change in interest
rates, The first assumption leads to the conclusion that fiscal influence on total
spending is great, while the second assumption leads to the conclusion that induced
changes in private spending offset a large part of the fiscal influence.
The exposition in the paper is of necessity somewhat technical, and it may be of par-
ticular interest to those familiar with the current debate. Extensive footnotes to the paper
provide references to some of the most useful presentations of the various points of view.
Page 10FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1970
BASIC ISSUES in monetary theory are being de-
bated at the present time, and increasing attention is
now being directed to the following rather technical
questions: Can the central bank control the (nominal)
money stock within fairly close limits, or should we
adopt the analytically more complete (and neutral)
approach of the large scale econometric models and
treat money as an endogenous variable? Can the cen-
tral bank implement its policy decisions and calibrate
its actions by means of an interest rate criterion — ex-
pressed in money market variables — or would it do
better to usc one of the monetary aggregates as an
indicator and target for monetary policy?1 Can the
central bank lower (or raise) market interest rates if
°Financial support by the National Science Foundation and
Wayne State University is gratefully acknowledged. in pre-
paring the paper for this Review, the author has benefited
from the seminar discussion and comments from the Research
staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
‘See W. Dewald, “Money Supply vs. Interest Rates as Proxi-
mate Objectives of Monetary Policy,” National Banking Re-
view, June 1966; P. Cagan, “interest Rates vs. the Quantity
Theory: The Policy Issues” and L. Craniley, “The Informa-
tional Content of interest Rates as Indicators of Monetary
Policy” in Proceedings: 1968 Money and Banking Work-
shop, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, May 1968;
M. Friedman, “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Eco-
nomic Review, March 1968; P. Hendershott, The Neutralized
Money Stock — An Unbiased Measure of Federal Reserve
Policy Actions (Richard D. irwin, 1968); the Joint Economic
Committee Hearings on Standards for Guiding Monetary
Action (\Vashington, 1968); D. Fand, “Comment: The
Impact of Monetary Policy in 1966,” Journal of Political
Economy, August 1968; the House Committee on Banking
and Currency Compendium on Monetary Policy Guidelines
and Federal Reserve Structure (Washington, 1968);
T. Mayer, Monetary Policy in the United States (Random
House, i968). See also A. Meigs, “Financial Stability and
inflation,” Bankers Magazine (London: February 1969);
A. Meigs, “The Case for Simple Rules,” and L. Gramley,
“Guidelines for Monetary Policy — The Case Against Simple
Rules,” presented at the Financial Conference sponsored by
the National Industrial Conference Board, February 21, 1969;
A. Meltzer, “Controlling Money” in the May 1969 issue of this
Review; L. C. Andersen, ‘Money and Economic Forecasting,”
and E. M. Gramlich, “Complicated and Simple Approaches
to Estimating the Role of Money in Economic Activity,”
Business Economics, September 1969; K. Brunner (ed),
Targets and Indicators of Monetary Policy, (Chandler Pub-
lishing Co., 1969); and L. C. Andersen “The Influence of
Economic Activity on the Money Stock: Some Additional
Evidence,” in the August 1969 issue of this Review.
For an interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s money
market strategy — the strategy encompassing instrument vari-
ables (e.g., open market operations), money market variables
(e.g., free reserves) and monetary variables (e.g., the mone-
tary aggregates) — and an interpretation of the proviso clause
as a device for correcting errors in the projected relation
between money market variables and the monetary variables,
see the recent paper by Governor Sherman Maisel, “Con-
trolling Monetary Aggregates” in Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Controlling Monetary Aggregates (September 1969).
(See also 4. M. Guttentag, “The Strategy of Open Market
Operations, ‘Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1966).
2
The hearings in March and April of the U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on High Interest Rates
(Washington, 1969) were directed at the causes of high and
rising market interest rates and the extent to which they
could be influenced by the central bank.
such a change is thought to be desirable?2 Can
the authorities better the stabilization performance of
recent years by giving more emphasis to the behavior
of monetary aggregates?8
These technical questions suggest a number of
more fundamental questions concerning recent stabi-
lization policies. Has the post-1965 inflation been a
monetary phenomenon resulting from the extraordi-
nary expansion in the monetary aggregates, or has
it primarily been due to an excessively lax, and inap-
propriate, fiscal policy?’ Does the theory of fiscal
policy (and its calculated multipliers) often assume
an elastic, permissive, or accommodating monetary
policy, and does it therefore fail to distinguish be-
tween a pure fiscal deficit excluding any money stock
effects, and an increase in the monetary aggregates
accompanied by a fiscal deficit?5 Is the transmission
mechanism as conceived in the income-expenditure
models a valid one, or may changes in the nominal
money stock directly affect private expenditures, ag-
gregate demand, and price levels?0 Should stabiliza-
tion policy continue to stress temporary changes
3
For an articulate and influential statement of the fiscal policy
approach to stabilization emphasizing discretionary changes
in the full-employment surplus, see W. Heller, New Dimen-
sions of Political Economy (Norton, 1966). The key stabiliza-
tion role assigned to changes in the full-employment surplus
is critically reviewed by C. Terborgh in his The New Eco-
nomics (Washington, 1968). For a discussion of the stabiliza-
tion roles to be assigned to monetary and fiscal policy see
the Friedman-Heller dialogue, Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy
(Norton, 1969).
‘See D. Fand, “The Chain Reaction-Original Sin (CROS)
Theory of Inflation,” Financial Analysts Journal (July 1969),
and ~‘“A Monetary InterRretation of the Post-1965 Infla-
tion in the United States, Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro,
No, 89, (June 1969), especially, Section I, “Has Monetary
Policy Been Tight Since 1965?,” pp. 103-106; and the
testimony by Chairman Martin (Board of Governors) and
Chairman McCracken (Council of Economic Advisers) in
High Interest Rates, op. cit., pp. 6-41.
5
See L. Andersen and J. Jordan, “Monetary and Fiscal Ac-
tions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic
Stabilization,” in the November 1968 issue of this Review;
the Comment by F. DeLeeuw and J. Kalchbrenner, and
Reply by Andersen and Jordan in the April 1969 issue of
this Review; M. Levy, “Monetary Pilot Policy, Growth and
Inflation” and W. Lewis, “Money is Everything’ Economics
— A Tempest in a Teapot” in the Conference Board Record
for January and April 1969; R. Davis, “How Much Does
Money Matter? A Look at Some Recent Evidence,” in the
June 1969 Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York: and L. C. Andersen, “The Influence of Economic
Activity on the Money Stock: Some Additional Evidence,”
op. cit.
~The transmission mechanism in aggregative models views
interest rates as an indicator of monetary policy, as a measure
of the cost of capital, and as a key element in the transmis-
sion mechanism. For a criticism, see D. Fand, “Comment:
The Impact of Monetary Policy in 1966,” op. cit., especially
Section II, “The Role of Interest Rates,” pp. 825-830; “A
Monetary Interpretation of the Post-1965 inflation in the
United States,” op. cit., especially Section II, pp. 106-113,
and Section iV, “Market Interest Rates (Conventional Yields)
or Prices (implicit Yields) ,“ pp. 118-119; and “Keynesian
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(discretionary or automatic) in the full-employment
surplus, as if it were the ultimate weapon, in light of
our recent experience?7
In this paper we take up four specific issues. We first
consider whether the central bank can actually control
the money stock. We then consider whether changes
in the (nominal) money stock are identifiable with
changes in real cash balances,and whether movements
in market interest rates adequately reflect movements
in real rates. The third question that we take up con-
cerns the analytical structure and policy implications
of the non-monetary theories of the price level. The
fourth and final question is: How do we define, and
measure, the monetary and fiscal effects that follow a
particular policy?
Can the Central Bank Control the
Nominal Money Stock?
The money stock at any moment in time is the
result of portfolio decisions by the central bank, by
the commercial banks, and by the public (including
the nonbank intermediaries) 8 the central bank de-
termines the amount of high-powered money or mone-
tary base, that is, currency plus bank reserves, that
it will supply;°the commercial banks determine the
Monetary Theories, Stabilization Policy, and the Recent in-
flation,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, August
1969, especially Section IV on “Keynesian Theories of Money
and Interest Rates.” See also C. Kaufman, “Current issues in
Monetary Economics and Policy: A Review,” Bulletin No. 57,
New York University Institute of Finance, May 1969.
T
The symposium volume Fiscal Policy and Business Capital
Formation (Washington, 1987) contains an informed discus-
sion of this subject. See especially the papers by P. Mc-
Cracken, C. Harriss, S. Fabricant, and R. Musgrave, and
the comments by C. Haberler and N. Ture. See also H. Stein,
“Unemployment, Inflation and Economic Stability” in
K. Gordon (ed), Agenda for the Nation (Brookiags, 1968).
8
For a discussion of the determinants of the money stock
see M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of
the U.S. 1867-1960 (Princeton, 1963), Appendix B on
“Proximate Detenninants of the Nominal Stock of Money”;
P. Cagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock
of Money 1875-1980 (Columbia, 1965), Chapter i on “The
Money Stock and Its Three Determinants”; K. Brunner, “A
Schema for the Supply Theory of Money,” International
Economic Review, January 1961; D. Fand, “Some implica-
tions of Money Supply Analysis,” American Economic
Review, May 1967.
°The high-powered money concept used by M. Friedman, A.
Schwartz and P. Cagan is essentially the monetary base
concept used by K. Brunner, A. Meltaer, and others. The
monetary base may be defined either in terms of the sources
(Federal Reserve credit, gold stock, Treasury items, etc.) or
uses (member bank reserves and currency). To compare
movements in the monetary base over time, we need to
make a correction for changes in reserve requirements. As
used here, the monetary base includes a reserve adjustment;
that is, it is equal to the source base plus the reserve
adjustment.
For a very clear exposition see L. Andersen and J. Jordan.
“The Monetary Base — Explanations and Analytical Use’ in the
August 1988 issue of this Review.
volume of loans and other assets that they will ac-
quire and the quantity of reserves they will hold as
excess (and free) reserves; and the public determines
how to allocate their holdings of monetary wealth
among currency, demand, time and savings deposits,
CD’s, intermediary claims, and other financial assets.
The money stock that emerges reflects all these
decisions.
It is a natural question to consider whether the
central bank, by controlling the monetary base, can
actually achieve fairly precise control over the mouey
stock. This depends on whether the link between the
monetary base and bank reserves, and between bank
reserves and the money stock (the monetary base —
bank reserves — money stock linkage) is fairly tight
and therefore predictable. If there is a tight linkage
the monetary authorities can formulate their policies
and achieve any particular target for the money
stock; on the other hand, if there is significant and
unpredictable slippage, and the central bank control
over the money stock is not sufficiently precise to
achieve a given target, it will necessarily have to for-
mulate its policies in terms of other variables that it
can control. The variable used to express (or define)
the central bank’s objective, or to implement its policy
decisions, must therefore be one that it can control
within reasonable limits,’0
The recently recurring idea that the money stock
is perhaps best viewed as an endogenous variable,
although not a new idea (it would have been ac-
ceptable to “real bill” theorists), has received new
and powerful support from those who follow the “New
View” approach in monetary economics.” New View
theorists have questioned the validity of much of
classical monetary theory concerning the importance
of money relative to other liquid assets, the unique-
10
It is presumably for this reason that some models treat
unborrowed reserves as the policy variable (the practice
followed in the FRB-MIT model and other econometric
models). These model builders believe that some com-
ponents of the monetary base and perhaps the entire base,
behave as endogenous variables — as the variables that re-
spond to income changes, and are not directly (or com-
pletely) under the control of the central bank. They do
believe that the Federal Reserve can control the volume
of unborrowed reserves.
~For the development of the New View see J. Gurley and
E. Shaw, Money in a Theory of Finance (Brookings, 1959);
D. Fand, “Intermediary Claims and the Adequacy of Our
Monetary Controls” and J. Tobin, “Commercial Banks as
Creators of ‘Money,’” in D. Carson (ed), Banking and
Monetary Studies (Invin, 1963); H. Johnson, Essays in
Monetary Economics (Allen and Unwin, 1967), Chapters
1 and 2; ‘N. Brainard, “Financial Intermediaries and a
Theory of Monetary Control,” in D. Hester and J. Tobin
(eds), Financial Markets and Economic Activity (Wiley,
1967); and K. Brunner, “The Role of Money and Monetary
Policy,” in the July 1968 issue of this Review.
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ness of commercial banks relative to other inter-
mediaries, and the extent to which the central
bank can control the nominal money stock.’2 They
argue that the central bank can control its instruments
(open market operations, reserve requirements, dis-
count rate) and some money market variables (free
reserves, Treasury bill rate); that the commercial
banks supply deposits at a fixed rate; and that the
stock of money and liquid assets which emerge — at
least in the short run — largely reflect the public’s
preference for demand and time deposits, interme-
diary claims, and other financial assets.”
Two schools of monetary economics differ on the
use of the money stock as an indicator or target vari-
able, and on the extent to which it is an endogenous
variable and therefore not available to the monetary
authorities as a stabilization instrument. The non-
monetarists believe that the central bank should for-
mulate its policies in terms of money market variables
and implement them through operations on the instru-
ment variables. They view the money stock as (in part)
an endogenous variable, and do not conceive of it as a
proper instrument or target variable. The monetarists
believe that the central bank can, and should, define
its objectives and implement its policies in terms of
the money stock. Indeed, these two conceptions of
the money stock and its role in monetary policy de-
cisions summarize some important substantive differ-
ences that have emerged in monetary economics:
(1) between the monetarist view that changes in the
nominal money stock may be a causal, active, and
‘2Tobin offers the following description of the New View:
“A more recent development in monetary economics tends
to blur the sharp traditional distinctions between money
and other assets and between commercial banks and other
financial intermediaries; to focus on demands for and sup-
plies of the whole spectrum of assets rather than on the
quantity and velocity of ‘money; and to regard the strue-
tare of interest rates, asset yields, and credit availabilities
rather than the quantity of money as the linkage between
monetary and financial institutions and pohcies on the one
hand and the real economy on the other.”
He also suggests that this general equilibrium approach to
the financial sector tends to question the presumed unique-
ness of commercial banks:
“Neither individually nor collectively do commercial banks
possess a widow’s cruse. Quite apart from legal reserve re-
quirements, commercial banks are limited in scale by the
same kinds of economic processes that determine the ag-
gregate size of other intermediaries.”
J. Tobin, “Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money,’”
op. cit., pp. 410-412,
‘
3
Some monetary theorists have argued that while a skillful
central bank can manipulate its controls to keep the nominal
money stock (M) on target, it is preferable nevertheless to
think of (M) as an endogenous variable. They argue that a
“theory which takes as data the instruments of control rather
than M, will not break down if and when there are changes
in the targets or the marksmanship of the authorities. See
J. Tobin, “Money, Capital and Other Stores of Value,’
American Economic Review, May 1961.
independent factor in influencing aggregate de-
mand and the price level, and the nonmonetarist
views ranging from (a) the older “real bills” doc-
trine that the money stock responds primarily to
changes in the real economy; (b) the Income-
Expenditure theories (associated with the 450 dia-
gram) which view money as an accommodating
factor; and (c) the more recent New View doc-
trine that the money stock is best viewed as one
of several endogenous liquidity aggregates;
(2) between the monetarist view that the money
stock — using either the conventional or the
broader definition — is a reasonably well-behaved
quantity, and the Radcliffe-type view that rejects
these measures as narrow and inappropriate, and
argues for a broader liquidity aggregate; and
(3) between the monetarist view that the monetary
policy posture should be gauged by the behavior
of a monetary aggregate, and the Income-Expend-
iture theories viewing market interest rates as the
proper indicator variable.
Many who question the advisability of operating
monetary policy in terms of money stock guidelines
also question whether the central bank control is pre-
cise enough to comply with the guideline require-
ments. The extent of this control is therefore a key
question. Is the money stock best viewed as an en-
dogenous variable — determined by the interaction of
the financial and real sectors — and outside the direct
control of the central bank? Or is it more nearly cor-
rect to view it as an exogenous variable — as a policy
instrument — that the authorities can control, and
whose behavior can be made to conform to the stabili-
zation guidelines?
This issue is essentially an empirical one: Does con-
trol over the monetary base and other instruments
provide the central bank with sufficient powers to fit
the behavior of the money stock into a given stabiliza-
tion program? The monetarists, in assigning an im-
portant role for the money stock in stabilization
policy, assume that the central bank can engineer
the desired behavior of the money stock. The sub-
stantive issue can be refonnulated in terms of an
empirically refutable hypothesis, as follows: Do
changes in commercial bank free reserve behavior,
and do portfolio shifts by the public involving cur-
rency, demand and time deposits, and other financial
assets, introduce enough variability and enough “noise”
to break the monetary base — bank reserves — money
stock linkage, and justify treating the money stock as
an endogenous variable — and essentially outside the
control of the central bank?
The empirical examination of this issue fits in nat-
urally to a framework of money supply analysis which
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I have described in an earlier article.’4 The analysis
developed there defines four money supply functions
which incorporate alternative assumptions concerning
portfolio, adjustments.
If we let
M the nominal money stock
X = a vector of Federal Reserve (monetary policy)
instruments variables (the snonetary base, re-
serve requirements, discount rate, Regula-
tion Q)
= a vector of endogenous financial variables
(e.g., the Treasury bill rate, the Federal funds
rate, the Eurodollar rate, the rate on time de-
posits and other intermediary claims)
T,C time deposits, currency, sl,ares and other fi-
nancial assets that are close substitutes for
demand deposits
1’ ~‘~‘ a vector of real sector variables (CNP, busi-
ness investment, durables, etc.)
a money supply (M.S.) function may be written as:
M f (X, rb; T,C; Y).
The four MS. functions that follow reflect alternative
ceteris paribas conditions changing the portfolio ad-
justments that we permit for both the banks and the
public:
(1) M.S.(I) is a short-run supply concept. It gives
the money supply response to a change in reserves
on the assumption that while banks may choose
to adjust their free reserves, the public can only
carry out a limited adjustment with respect to
currency, time deposits and other financial assets.
There are several ways to impose certeris paribas
conditions on the public’s holdings of currency,
time deposits, and other financial assets. Some in-
vestigators hold levels of these assets constant,
others hold ratios constant, and different investi-
gators impose this ceteris paribas condition in a
manner most compatible with their model, M.S.U)
is of the form Mf(X,rb; T,C:Y), where T and C
specify our assumptions for currency, time de-
posits, and other close substitutes. To use it as a
short-run concept we assume that all variables in
the real sector of the economy, including stocks
of real assets and flows such as consumption and
investment, are held constant, so that it is pri-
marily a function of the monetary policy instru-
ment variables. Accordingly, if M.S.(I) is fairly
stable it provides some support for the view that
the monetary authorities can achieve fairly pre-
cise control over the money stock.
(2) To construct M.S.(H) we remove some of these
portfolio restrictions by permitting the public to
adjust their holdings of currency and time depos-
its, and the terms on which banks supply time
deposits to reflect the underlying preferences. This
function is of the form f(X,ro:Y), and does not
tm4See D. Fund, “Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis,
American Economic Review, May 1967.
contain any arbitrary assumptions about currency,
time deposits, or the rate paid on time deposits.
It is derived by assuming: (a) that the banks
may adjust their free reserves and the rate paid
on time deposits; and (b) that the public’s hold-
ings of currency and time deposits will be deter-
mined by their demand function for these assets.
Although M.S.(1I) does permit a greater degree
of portfolio adjustment. it still is a short-run and
restricted function because it assumes that the
real sector variables and all other financial assets
are held constant.
(3) To construct M.S.(IIl) we permit portfolio ad-
justments throughout the entire financial sector
and solve all the equations in the financial sector
simultaneously. The Treasury bill rate and other
rates whiel, are endogenous variables in the finan-
cial sector will therefore be determined, and no
longer enter as independent arguments in the
money supply function. MS. (Ill) is a reduced
form equation of the form M = g(X:Y) where all
endogenous financial variables will have values
determined by the simultaneous solution of the
behavior equations in the financial sector. This
function measures the supply response due to a
change in the monetary base or some other policy
instrument, assuming that all the variables in the
financial sector adjust simultaneously.
(4) Finally, we define M.S.(lV) in the form of
M “ g(X), a reduced-form equation which mea-
sures the movements in the money stock in re-
sponse to adjustments in both the real and the
financial sector. To derive this money supply we
must solve all the structural equations in the finan-
cial and real sectors simultaneously to obtain the
reduced form. The real sector variables are no
longer treated as exogenous variables, but are now
determined simultaneously with all the endogen-
ous financial sector variables. This reduced-form
MS. gives the equilibrium stocks of money as a
function of the monetary base and other monetary
policy instrument variables. This is the natural
MS. function to construct for those who view
the money stock as passive and responding to real
sector developments, and to those who view the
money stock as an accommodating variable, whose
changes may be necessary in order to validate
changes in the real economy.5’
This brief review of the fourmoney supply functions
suggests that it is possible to test some of the substan-
tive points that have come up in the recent “control
over themoney stock” discussions.For example, MS.(I)
postulates that we can predict the effect of changes
in the monetary base (and other instruments) on the
money stock, assuming that the public’s portfolio ad-
‘
tm
The M.S.(IV) function as written implies that an increase
in the monetary base will affect the money supply if it in-
duces some real sector changes. A “real bills’ proponent
might therefore prefer to write it as follows:
M”f(Y) and X=g(Y);
where M and X are both determined by the real sector
variables in Y.
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justments are restricted; M.S.(II) postulates that we
can predict the effect of a change in the monetary
base (and other instruments) on the money stock,
even allowing the public to adjust their currency and
holdings of demand and time deposits; while M.S.(IH)
postulates that we can predict the money stock re-
sponse, even allowing the public to adjust their entire
portfolios. These three MS. functions assume that
commercial bank free reserve belmavior and the pub-
lic’s behavior with respect to currency, demand and
time deposits are stable; and that the substitution of
intermediary claims and liquid assets for money con-
forms to behavior that can be incorporated into a
stable MS. function. Econometric estimates of these
three functions provide some evidence for testing the
reliability of the monetary base — honk reserve —
money stock linkage.’6
Those who follow the “real bills” view — that the
money stock is determined by the real sector variables
— or the view in many income-expenditure models —
that the money stockis an accommodatingor permissive
variable — presumably deny the possibility of con-
structing such functions, In their view these three MS.
functions do not allow any changes in fiscal policy or in
the real sector variables; they permit- only restricted
changes in the financial sector variables, and they
emphasize the monetary base and the central bank’s
instrument variables. Accordingly, they should pre-
dict that the first three M,S. functions highlighting
the instrument variables are unstable and lack con-
tent; indeed, their approach to monetary theory im-
plies that only M.S.(IV), which incorporates changes
in the real sector, contains the relevant independent
variables.
An analysis of these four money supply functions has
implications for the use of the money stock as an inde-
pendent and major instrument in stabilization. Those
who argue that money is, at least in part, an en-
dogenous variable, and who question the precision
with which it can be controlled, assume (implicitly
perhaps) that no statistically significant supply func-
tion can be estimated relating the money stock to the
monetary base and other instrument variables. More-
over, if such a function is estimated it would haveto be
a reduced-form function, and a variant of the MS. (IV)
concept, incorporating feedbacks from the real sector.
‘
6
A comparison of the three MS. functions enables us to
evaluate the quantitative effects of these portfolio shifts on
the money stock. Consider a given change in the monetary
base, or any other instrument variable, and compare the
money stock response in these three functions. The calcu-
lated differences reflect the portfolio adjustments that we
introduce as we move from M.S.U) to M.S.(lII) —i.e.,
shifts among currency, demand and time deposits, and the
substitution of intermediary claims for money — and thus
provide a measure of these effects on the money stock.
In an earlier study, we compared estimates of the
M.S. functions calculated from different econometric
models. We found that the elasticities and multipliers
for the first three M.S. functions based primarily on
financial variables appear to he stable enough to
justify further effort towards their refinement and
improvement. We also found that “There are at
present too few studies available to calculate reliable
MS. (IV) elasticities. But the available evidence,
meager though it may be, does not point to any
superiority of MS. (IV) over MS. (I)~ and does not
appear to favor a real view over a monetary view.
Those who take the view that money is passive,
responding primarily to the real economy, have to
recognize that this is an assumption rather than a
preposition derived from empirical evidenee.”~
Our findings also suggest that the money stock
behavior could be made to conform to a specified
stabilization program. For example, by controlling
movements in the monetary base, monetary authorities
can control quite adequately movements in the money
stock. The chart below illustrates a rather close
relationship between the monetary base and the
money stock.
*afl*Scale Money~Stoc1c -and Monetary Base
silkontoif Dollar. ‘°‘~ -ftdI,on ttD~jIuts



























rsee D. Fand, “Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis,”
op. cit., p. 392. The calculated elasticities and multipliers
suggest that the short run MS. functions — such as the MS.
(I) and MS.(II) — are reasonably stable. These are pre-
liminary findings, derived by using the steady-state solutions
to simplify the analysis; they are subject to revision and
require the construction of significance tests.
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‘While this research is far from conclusive it
is consistent with, a number of other findings.’8
It is difficult to maintain the view that the money
stock is sufficiently endogenous so that it is outside
the direct control of the authorities, without getting
dangerously close to a “real bills” position. Ac-
cordingly, the focus of the “control over the money
stock” discussion will shift, in my opinion, to the more
interesting question — and the more relevant and less
ideological question — concerning the length of the
period needed to give the Federal Reserve System
sufficient control to achieve a given money stock
guideline. Assuming that a “reasonable” degree of pre-
cision has been defined, can the particular guideline
requirements be achieved in a week? a month? a
quarter? Or must we extend the period in order to
overcome false signals, “noise,” forecasting errors and
other disturbances.”°It would appear that the de-
gree of precision desired is not independent of the
time period required for the execution of policy, and
it is reassuring to note that recent discussions have
been directed increasingly at these points.
The Income-Expenditure Theory and the
Quantity Theory:
Nominal and Real Quantities
There is considerable agreement on the proposition
in monetary theory that the real value of the money
stock is an endogenous variable, determined by the
interaction of the financial and real sectors, and there-
fore outside the control of the monetary authorities.
This is in sharp contrast to the theoretical (and prac-
tical) disagreements concerning the extent to which
the central bank can control the behavior of the
18
See the references to Andersen, Brunner, Cagan, Dewald,
Friedman and Schwartz, Meigs, and Meltzer in footnotes
1, 8, and 11.
~~This formulation of the problem has come up in several
recent papers. Covemor Maisel emphasizes this point as
follows:
“This growth of money supply in any period is the result
of actions taken by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the
commercial banks and the public. Over a longer period, the
Fed may play a paramount role, but this is definitely not
the case in the short run. To the best of my knowledge, the
Fed has not and probably would have great difficulties
controlling within rather wide limits the growth of the nar-
rowly defined money supply in any week or month.”
See Sherman J. Maisel, ‘tontrolling Monetary Aggregates,”
op. cit. For some other discussions of this issue, see A. J.
Meigs, “The Case for Simple Rules,” op. cit.; L. Gmamley,
“Guidelines for Monetary Policy — The Case Against Simple
Rules,” op. cit.; the Hearings on Standards for Guidin~
Monetary Action, op. cit.; A. Meltzer, “Controlling Money,’
op. cit. See also L. Kalish, “A Study of Money Stock Con-
trol, Working Paper No, 11, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, for an interesting attempt to develop confidence
limits for measuring the money managers’ success in con-
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(nominal) money stock. In CIIIliibrium, tl stock of
real cash balances has a value — analogous to, say,
the real wage — which the stabilization authorities
cannot readily influence, except in those special eases
where nominal and real variables move together. The
above chart demonstrates that such is not always the
ease. For instance, the nominal money stock was un-
changed during the latter half of 1966, while real
money balances activity declined.
Income-expenditure theorists in their macroeconomic
models often use nominal balances when the analysis
requires real balances. This substitution of a nominal
quantity (which can beeasily changed) for a realquan-
tity (with a determinate equilibrium value) has two
consequences: it suggests that an increase in nominal
balances will always tend to lower market interest
rates; it also implies that changes in market rates
correspond to, and reflect, changes in real rates. This
procedure is sometimes justified by a special inter-
pretation of the demand for money, an interpretation
that is often attributed to Keynes’ General Theory.
It is therefore useful to recall the transformation of
the demand for money in Keynes’ General Theory.
Instead of defining a demand for a quantity of real
balances, the demand for money (or real balances)
was transformed into the liquidity preference func-
tion and a basic detenninant of the interest rate: the
liquidity preference function together with the (real)
quantity of money determines the interest rate; and
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since Keynes assumed explicitly that the price level
was given, he could move from nominal to real bal-
ances to detennine the market (or nominal) interest
rate, the real interest rate (or return on capital), and
the equilibrium quantity of real balances.2°The post-
Keynesian income models follow the General Theory
in treating tIle demand for money as a liquidity pref-
erence function, but they do not determine explicitly
the equilibrium quantity of real cash balances. The
failure to define an equilibrium value for the real
money stock opens up the possibility of treating both
the real and nominal money stock as policy varia-
bles,21 and as close substitutes.
The substitutionof nominal balances forreal balances
inmany post-Keynesian income-expenditure models has
extremely important consequences. To assume that
nominal and real balances may be interchanged is to
assume that the authorities have the power to print
real capital and wealth: it exaggerates the control of
the authorities over real interest rates (and rates of
return); and it necessarily abstracts from any direct
effects of money on prices (note that the link be-
tween the money stock and prices requires that we
distinguish between nominal and real values). This
tendency to abstract from the price level, to freely
substitute nominal and real variables, and to equate
market interest rates with real rates (of return) re-
flects the analytical failure to define equilibrium con-
ditions for real balances, and is a striking feature of
the post-Keynesian income models.
In sharp contrast to the income-expenditure theory,
we have the following postulates concerning real
balances in the modern quantity theory: (1) the
money demand function defines the demand for
real cash balances; (2) the quantity of real cash
balances is an endogenous variable and not under
the control of the monetary authorities (except for
the very short run); and (3) changes in nominal
20
For an elaboration of this thenie see D. Fand, “Keynesian
Monetary Theories, Stabilization Policy and the Recent In-
flation,” op. cit., Section II on “The Demand for Money
and Liquidity Preference: Real Balances and Interest Rates,”
which discusses the changing role of real cash balances in
the Keynesian and quantity theories, the shifting emphasis
from the price level to the level of employment, and the
transformation of the money demand function into a liquidity
preference function. 2t
For a penetrating analysis emphasizing the originality and
generality of the Keynes theory, in contrast to the rigidities,
traps, and elasticity pessimism in many of the post-Keyne-
sian income models, see A. Leijonhufvud, On Keynesian
Economics and the Economics of Keynes (Oxford, 1968).
See also D. Fand, “Keynesian Monetary Theories, Stabiliza-
tion Policy and the Recent Inflation,” op. cit., Section III
on “Three Keynesian Liquidity Preference Theories,” and
J. Tobin’s seminal article on “Money, Capital, and Other
Stores of Value,” op. cit., for his illuminating analysis of an
aggregative model with three assets.
balances will generally have effects on market interest
rates, on income, and on prices.22 For the analysis of
transition periods it assumes that an increase in
nominal balances will have a compound effect on in-
terest rates — including a short-run liquidity (Keynes)
effect, an income effect, and a longer-run (Fisher)
price expectation effeet.23 The modern quantity theory
also assumes that the demand for money is quite stable,
and that a velocity function (derived from the money
demand function) may provide a useful link between
(changes in) money and (changes in) money in-
come; and, in contrast to the earlier quantity theory,
postulates a stable velocity function, but allows
marginal velocity to differ from average velocity.
Taken together, these quantity theory propositions
have two important implications. They suggest: (1)
that the monetary authorities do not control real in-
terest rates or the stock of real balances, even if they
can always control the stock of nominal money and
thereby influence nominal or market interest rates;
(2) that money is an important variable for explain-
ing changes in prices, since the equilibrium quantity
of real balances links changes in nominal money with
changes in the price level. Accordingly, the modern
quantity theory uses the money demand function to
predict the level of money income and prices if out-
put is given, or changes in money income if output
varies with changes in the money stock.
The modem quantitytheory and income-expenditure
theory thus differ sharply in their analysis of the money
demand function. In the modem quantity theory it
serves as a velocity function relating either money and
money income, or marginal changes in money and
money income (if both output and marginal velocity
vary with the money stock); in the income-expenditure
theory, it serves as a liquidity preference theory of in-
2m
See L. Mints, Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society
(McGraw-Hill, 1950); M. Friedman (ed), Studies in the
Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago, 1958), and The Op~
timurn Quantity of Money (Aldine, 1969), especially Chap-
ters 6-9; H. Johnson, Essays in Monetary Economics (liar-
yard, 1967), Chapters 1-3; D. Patinkiri, Money, Interest
and Prices, 2nd ed. (Harper, 1965), Chapter XV; and
C. Warburton, Depression, Inflation, and Monetary Policy,
(Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
23
For a more explicit statement of the relation between
changes in the nominal money stock and interest rates see
M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, Trends in Money, Income
and Prices (forthcoming); M. Friedman, Dollars and Deficits
(Prentice Hall, 1968); P. Cagan and A. Gandolfi, “The
Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates,” American
Economic Review, May 1969; W. Gibson and G. Kaufman,
“The Sensitivity of Interest Rates to Changes in Money and
Income,” Journal of Political Economy, May 1968;
D. Meiselman, “Bond Yields and the Price Level: The Gibson
Paradox” in Banking and Monetary Studies, op. cit.; and
D. I, Fand, “A Monetarist Model of the Monetary Process,”
forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.
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terest rates, or of changes in interest rates (if the price
level is given and determined independently of the
monetary sector). Accordingly, the modem quantity
theory focuses on discrepancies between actual and
desired real balances, distinguishes between (exoge-
nous) nominal balances and (endogenous) real
balances, emphasizes monetary aggregates rather than
interest rates, and highlights nominal money as the
operational policy variable; the income-expenditure
theory focuses on discrepancies between actual and
full-employment output, abstracts from price level
changes, emphasizes an interest rate transmission
mechanism, views the monetary aggregates as endo-
genous variables, and highlights the full-employment
surplus as the operational policy variable.24
Viewed as general theories of income determination,
both theories have deficiencies. The modem quantity
theory seeks to explain prices, or money income, but
often abstracts from the level of employment; the
income-expenditure theory seeksto explain the levelsof
employment, but often abstracts from the price level;
this difference in focus mirrors the change in the analyt-
ical roles of real balances and interest rates in the
two theories. The quantity theory emphasis on real
balances as an endogenous variable implies that the
attempt by the monetary authorities to raise the money
stock may cause prices to rise, and also cause nominal
and real interest rates to diverge. In contrast, the in-
come-expenditure theory, by dc-emphasizing the endo-
geneity of real balances, implies that real balances and
interest rates can be controlled (within limits) by the
24The mnemonic statements that money is or is not important
do not bring out the essential monetary differences between
the income and quantity theories. In some ways the income-
expenditure theory attaches greater significance to money
than does the quantity theory. Thus, the income-expenditure
theory assumes that it is often possible to permanently lower
interest rates, or rates of return, by an increase in nominal
money, while the quantity theory is more inclined to view
nominal money changes as having a permanent effect mainly
on money income and prices. Yet because quantity theorists
are often analyzing situations where inappropriate monetary
policies may have caused severe difficulties (e.g., in the
1930’s), they may foster the impression that erron in mone-
tary policy are always associated with such drastic
consequences.
One other paradox may he noted. Many ineome-expendi-
lure theorists treat the nominal money stock as an endog-
enous variable because they believe that this approach
assumes less and is therefore more accurate. But while this
treatment of the money stock is most appropriate in this
formal sense, it may apparently also lead to substantive
errors. For example, the large scale econometric models
treat the nominal money stock as an endogenous variable,
but do not restrict the movements in real balances by well-
defined equilibrium conditions. The assumption that an
increase in nominal balances will increase real balances may
have been responsible for some of the forecasting errors and
policy mistakes in 1968. This assumption may involve a more
serious error, substantively and analytically, than treating
the nominal money stock, formally, as an exogenous variable.
authorities — an impression that is reinforced by their
failure to distinguish between nominal and real rates.
The analysis of money, interest rates, and prices in
the post-Keynesian income theories may explain sev-
eral of the troublesome features of recent stabilization
policy: the use of market interest rates as an indicator
of monetary policy; the tendency to minimize the
price level consequences of excessive monetary
growth; the failure to recognize the impact of infla-
tionary expectations on market interest rates; the re-
luctance to distinguish between nominal and real
quantities; and the conviction that the rise in market
interest rates since 1966 was due to an increased
demand for money, and not the result of excessive
growth in the money supply.25
The failure of income-expenditure theorists to con-
sider the impact of accelerated (excessive) monetary
growth on rising (or high) market interest rates, and to
distinguish between market and real interest rates, is
especially relevant for analyzing the post-1965 inflation
and the stabilization difficulties since June 1968. The
surprising failure of the Revenue and Expenditure
Control Act of June 1968 to cool the economy thus
far could be explained by noting that the fiscal “re-
frigeration” effect was offset by the monetary “boiler”
effect.26 The authorities, while fighting inflation with
the surcharge, also wished to lower interest rates and
move toward a tighter fiscal and easiermonetary policy
during this period, and this led to a very substantial
increase in the monetary aggregates.
Many who favored monetary expansion after the
June tax package based their case on the desirability
(and social necessity) of lowering market interest
rates. In retrospect, it seems difficult to suppose that
an increase in nominal money will raise real balances,
lower interest rates, curtail disintermediation, facilitate
residential construction, and somehow not raise ag-
gregate demand or prices. But an increase in the
25
For a recent, and very useful, statement of the income
theory approach to stabilization, incorporating a commit-
ment to economic growth and viewing it as a key aspect of
government policy, see W. Heller (ed), Perspectives on
Economic Growth (Random House, 1968). Because the
contributors to this volume are outstanding, it may not be
inappropriate to mention that the chapters dealing with
stabilization policy and monetary theory provide examples
illustrating the several questionable tendencies just sum-
marized. Obviously these tendencies are not just limited to
those whose understanding of the income theory may be
questioned. It is for this reason that I do not regard these
characteristics as analytical errors, but think ot them as
“methodological commitments” that may have become
burdensome, and perhaps analytically oppressive.
26
See the cogent analysis by A. Wojnilower, “Blowing Hot
and Cold,” First Boston Corporation (September 1968).
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money stock which takes place in the midst of an
inflation will not only raise prices but also raise market
interest rates. Nevertheless, if true, it suggests that
an incredibly optimistic theory —based on a refusal
to acknowledge the endogeneity of real cash balances
and its implications for diverging nominal and real
rates — may have contributed directly to the infla-
tionary pressures which are still continuing; and it may
also have contributed to our 1966 stabilization diffi-
culties, if the authorities believed that monetary ex-
pansion would bring about lower interest rates.27
The stabilization difficulties that we have experi-
enced since 1965 may he related to two questionable
propositions about money, which are implicit in many
income-expenditure models: (1) that the authoritiescan
affect real balances if they can control the nominal
stock of money; and (2) that the authorities can in-
fluence real rates through central bank operations
which change nominal market rates. Although both
of these propositions are generally accepted, they
have only a limited validity, and may lead to serious
policy errors when applied to a high-pressure economy
such as the United States in the post-1965 period.
In an underemployed economy, nominal quantities
and nominal rates may move with real quantities and
real rates, and real balances may be sufficiently flexi-
ble to be treated as a policy variable. But in a high-
pressure economy with rising prices, nominal and real
quantities no longer coincide; the real (value of the)
money stock cannot be treated as a policy variable,
and an increase in the money stock will not only raise
prices but will raise market interest rates as well. A
similar questionarises regarding the behaviorof interest
rates. In a slack economy market interest rates and real
rates move together; but in a high-employment econ-
omy with rising prices, market rates and real rates may
diverge (see accompanying table), Indeed, in a period
of price inflation, constant real rates are necessarily
associated with rising market rates, so that movements
in the market rates cannot always correspond to real
rates.
The endogeneity of the real (value of the) money
stock, as indicated by the divergence between nominal
and real balances and by the divergence between
real and market interest rates, is thus a manifestation
of an economy approaching full utilization. And we
27
The fear of overkill articulated by influential sources in the
summer of 1968 may have served to reconcile the views of
those who favored the tax increase primarily as a stabiliza-
tion measure to cool the inflation with the views of those
who favored the tax increase to shift the policy mix to
achieve lower interest rates and stimulate socially desirable
capital expenditures.
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need to investigate empirically when movements in
interest rates and in money balances begin to d.Lvcrge,
and whether the divergence between real and nom-
inal interest rates is related to the divergence between
real and nominal balances.28
Many investigators have commented on the mone-
tary lag, and have suggested that because of this
lag we would expect very sharp movements in inter-
est rates — as the initial response to changes in the
money stock. It is not clear how the monetary lag
may be affected by the divergence between market
and real interest rates and between nominal and real
balances. Knowledge of the conditions when real and
nominal balances diverge, of the process that causes
interest ratesto diverge, and of the mechanism through
which the monetary lag operates, should be useful in
improving stabilization policy. It would also help ree-
28
Somewhere between the slack economy and the inflationary
high-pressure economy there is a change in the relation be-
tween nominal and real balances and between nominal and
real rates. Responsible policy officials must therefore identify
and take account of the divergence between nominal and
real rates, especially if they follow an interest rate criterion
and use money market rates in the implementation of mone-
tary policy decisions.
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oneile the income-expenditure and modem quantity
theories and thus help complete the work initiated by
Keynes by providing us with a truly general theory
of employment, interest and money.
The Non-Monetary Theories of
Price Level and Inflation
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that we do not
have a satisfactory theory of the price level or of in-
flation, The post-Keynesian income and modem quan-
tity theories provide different income determination
models: the income-expenditure theory emphasizes the
consumption function and other income-expenditure
relationships; while the modern quantity theory em-
phasizes the demand for money and portfolio adjust-
ments.29 As theories of national income both theories
have limitations, as we have just noted, and neither
theory provides us with an articulated theory of the
price level and a basis for allocating a given change in
national income into the fraction due to real output
and the fraction due to price level changes.
The modem quantity theory, in the absence of an
explicit theory of the price level, nevertheless assumes
a link between money and prices, and views move-
ments in the absolute price levels and inflationary (or
deflationary) pressures as reflecting current and past
changes in the money stock. The income-expenditure
theory de-emphasizes any direct link between mone-
tary assets and prices, and highlights non-monetary
factors in explaining upward movements in the price
level and inflation. This is particularly evident in the
recent large scale econometric models (Brookings,
Michigan, Wharton, FRB-MIT), which do not in-
corporate monetary (or fiscal) variables directly to
explain the price level; they base the prediction equa-
tions for the absolute price level on concepts and
empirical regularities that may be appropriate for
micro-analysis and for the determination of relative
price movements.50
29
The capital-theoretic orientation of the post-Keynesian quan-
tity theory, emphasizing portfolio choice and the substituta-
bility of mooey for other assets, has been heavily influenced
by the Keynesian Liquidity Preference theory. Unlike the
older quantity theory based either on the payments rela-
tions of the transactions approach or the store of value re-
lations of the Cambridge approach, it follows the Keynesian
theory in treating the demand for money as a problem in
capital theory, focussing on the composition of the balance
sheet and the selection of assets. See J. Tobin, ‘A Dynamic
Aggregative Model,” Journal of Political Economy, April
1955, and “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk,’
Review of Economic Studies, February 1958; and M. Fried-
man (ed), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, op. cit. 50
1n their progress report on the Federal Reserve-MIT model,
F. DeLeeuw and E. Gramlieh summarize the findings of the
econometric models as follows:
“The evidence from several of the large econometric mod-
As an illustration, consider the recent (preliminary)
FRB-MIT model of the price-wage-labor sector which
follows the other large scale models in basing prices
on unit labor costs, other markup factors, and intro-
duces additional variables to pick up the influence of
demand shifts or oligopoly pricing.3’ This is essen-
tially a non-monetary theory of the price level, It
seems to suggest that a general excise or uniform sales
tax (10 per cent on all commodities) would raise
prices; yet an income tax, designed to yield the same
dollar amount, would presumably lo\ver prices and
certainly not cause them to rise, But a conclusion
that a uniform excise tax raises the price level, while
an income tax which produces equivalent revenue
would lower prices seems paradoxical. Moreover, since
there are no explicit specifications given for the money
stock we have the following strange results:
(1) an excise tax may he inflationary even when the
revenue is impounded and the stock of money is
reduced; and
(2) an income tax is deflationary when the stock of
money is maintained, or even when allowed to
grow at an accelerated rate. This paradox illus-
trates the difficulties of explaining absolute price
level movements with concepts that are appropri-
ate for relative price analysis, and of using an
els — the Wharton School Model, the Commerce Depart-
ment Model, the Michigan Model, and to a lesser extent
the Brookings Model — is that monetary ,forces are rather
unimportant in influencing total demand.
See F. DeLeeuw and E. Cramlich, “The Channels of
Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1969.
The Brookings model is presented in J. Duesenberry, et
al., The Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the
United States (Chicago, 1965); The Michigan model is pre-
sented each year at a conference and later published in a
volume. The Economic Outlook for 1969 gives the 1969
model presented at the November 1968 conference. The
FRB-MIT model is described in F. DeLeeuw and E. Cram-
lich, “The Federal Reserve-MIT Econometric Model,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, January 1968, and in “The Channels
of Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1969.
The Wharton model is presented in M. Evans and L. Klein,
The Wharton Econometric Forecasting Model (University
of Pennsylvania, 1967).
S1F DeLeeuw and E. Cramlich in “The Channels of Mone-
tary Policy”, op. cit., describe it as follows:
“Prices are assumed to be a variable markup over wages,
with excise taxes completely shifted onto consumers. The
variables determining the markup are the productivity trend
which allows producers to maintain profit shares even though
wages rise faster than prices, fann and import prices which
measure other costs, and the ratio of unfilled orders to
shipments, which indicates demand shifts.’
For a criticism of the price level equations in the Brook-
ings model see Z. Criliehes, “The Brookings Model Volume:
A Review Article,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
May 1968, especially his discussions of prices and wages,
pp. 221-223, and the rejoinder by C. Fromm and L. Klein,
especially pp. 237 and 238. For a more recent attempt to
develop price equations without bringing in monetary fac-
tors explicitly see 0. Eekstein and C. Fromm, “The Price
Equation,” American Economic Review, December 1968.
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aggregative theory that does not incorporate any
direct influence of money on prices.32
The drift towards non-monetary theories of the
absolute price level is not a new development in the
1960’s; it has been going on steadily since the end of
World War II. And though these theories may have
descriptive (or analytical) relevance in suggesting
either the initiating factors, or the process in particu-
lar price level movements, they are not easily inte-
grated into a coherent set of anti-inflationary policies.
Moreover, if the absolute price level is indeed a func-
tion of unit labor costs, markup factors, new or un-
filled orders, and other non-monetary factors, then it
does sharply limit the scope of the traditional stabili-
zation measures which are geared to a demand infla-
tion. In addition, the focus given to the non-monetary
aspects by the theorists of the “new inflation” may
have also diverted attention from the “classical infla-
tion” due to expansive monetary-fiscal policies. The
conjuncture of all these factors may help explain our
inability to identify and deal effectively with the post-
1965 inflation in the United States.
The following six-stage sketch of inflation theory,
which summarizes its evolution since World War II,
ifiustrates the shift in emphasis away from the effects
of aggregate demand on prices, toward an emphasis
of the effects of costs and aggregate supply. The
purging of monetary variables from inflation (and
price level) theory is also pointed out. One inference
emerging from this sketch is that more attention
needs to be given to the monetary aggregates and
their effect on aggregate demand, if we wish to im-
prove our ability to forecast price level developments
and deal more effectively with inflation.33
(1) The “inflationary gap” analysis developed by
Keynes during World War H focused on an econ-
omy where prices were rising because of an excess
of aggregate demand over supply. Unlike the
32
For a discussion of this issue see H. Brown, “The Incidence
of a Ceneral Output or a Ceneral Sales Tax’ in AEA
Readings in the Economics of Taxation (Irwin, 1959); E.
Rolph, Theory of Fiscal Economics (University of California,
1954); R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1959); and A. Morag, On Taxes and Inflation
(Random House, 1965).
33
Professor C. Haberler is an outstanding exception to this
tendency. His Inflation: Its Causes and Consequences (Wash-
ington, 1966), first published in 1961, emphasized the need
for coordinated monetary and fiscal policy in fighting a
demand inflation,
For a survey of inflation theory see M. Bronfenbrenner
and F. Holaman, “Survey of Inflation Theory,’ American
Economic Review, September 1962; H. Johnson, Essays in
Monetary Economics (London, 1967), especially Chapter 3;
and S. Rousseas (ed), Inflation: Its Causes, Consequences
and Control (New York University, 1968).
classical quantity theory formulation, it did not
assume any particular link from money to ag-
gregate demand, but was intended as an improved
theory of an excess-demand inflation. This ap-
proach fell into disfavor when the postwar em-
ployment forecasts for 1946 and 1947, based on
inflationary gap analysis, turned out very badly,
and it was widely recognized that the income-
expenditure relations were not properly specified
in monetary terms. Not surprisingly, this analysis
went out of style at the end of the 1940’s.
(2) Since the early 1950’s, the post-Keynesian income
models have typically emphasized the role of ag-
gregate demand in employment while dc-empha-
sizing its impact on price level movements. One
of the earliest cost inflation theories — the wage-
push model — was accepted by many neo-Keyne-
sians as an explanation of the creeping inflation
of the 1950’s; and it seemed to be a consistent
application of the Keynesian doctrine that a cut
in the money wage will cause prices to fall (by
the same amount) and will not, therefore, stim-
ulate employment in the depressions. The Key-
nesian view that the real wage is determined
independently, and not influenced by changes in
the money wage, would also seem to suggest that
rising prices are due to rising wages. Later ver-
sions of cost inflation models stressed markup
pricing, seetoral shifts, and administered (non-
market clearing) prices. And since creeping infla-
tion was generally associated with a reduction in
aggregate supply due either to rising factor costs
or to shifts in demand, it seemed to follow quite
naturally that a reduction in aggregate demand
was not an appropriate policy for fightinginflation.
The wide acceptance of the thesis that the
creeping inflation of the 1950’s (viewed as the
typical inflation of advanced industrial countries)
was basically an aggregate supply phenomenon
had two important consequences: it rationalized
the view that monetary policy should play only a
very minor role in fighting inflation; and it also lent
support to the view that the stabilization authori-
ties should focus directly on the behavior of wages
and prices and explore new stabilization tech-
niques such as incomes policies, wage-price guide-
posts, and possibly including indicative planning
and other techniques of supply management.34
(3) Reinforcing the idea that creeping inflation was
an aggregate supply phenomenon, and requiring
therefore a national wage-guidepost (or incomes)
policy, was the growing skepticism about whether
monetary policy could play any constructive role
in stabilization. First, there was a general concern
that a restrictive monetary policy would reduce
output but not succeed in lowering prices; second,
it was suggested that the monetary authorities
may not always be able to control the stock of
3See the Joint Economic Committee volume on The Relation
of Prices to the Economic Stability and Growth (Washing-
ton, 1958) for a fairly comprehensive compendium of non-
monetary inflation theories that were developed to explain
the creeping inflation of the l05
0
’s.
Page 21FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1970
privately held liquid assets through their control
of the money stock; and finally, that aggregate
demand was functionally related to the total vol-
ume of liquid assets and not to one component
of this total — such as the narrow money stock.35
(4) The cost inflation models assume that creeping
inflation (unlike galloping inflation) is an aggregate
supply phenomenon and not due to an increase in
aggregate demand. They differ only in the specific
mechanism that they single out: some focus on
unions and wage-push; others on markup pricing,
on market power and bargaining strength, and
on administered prices. But they all assume an
autonomous rise in factor costs, a reduction in
aggregate supply, and a rise in prices, even
though aggregate demand is stable. Similarly,
although the demand-shift inflation model does
not initiate the process with an autonomous rise
in factor costs, it follows the cost models in ex-
plaining the price rise without introducing any
notion of excess demand.
(5) At the close of the 1950’s, Samuelson, Solow, and
others developed the “trade-off” analysis of creep-
ing inflation. They start with a Phillips Curve — a
function relating unemployment and percentage
changes in money wage rates — and derive from
this a trade-off function — which relates unem-
ployment and the rate of price change. They sug-
gest that the unemployment rate at a stable price
level may be unbearably high and socially unac-
ceptable, and that we may have to accept a given
degree of inflation (a specified rise in the price
level) if we wish to lower the unemployment rate.
If this trade-off function, incorporating a dynamic
money-illusion effect, applies to the steady-state
and is not just a temporary phenomenon, it
implies that the degree of inflation is related to
the level of unemployment that society will
tolerate. It also suggest that we may have
inflationary recessions — even substantial unem-
ployment does not necessarily guarantee us a sta-
ble price level. From an analytical point of view
this theory is a radical departure from traditional
analysis in assuming that real variables (the level
of employment and of output) are not independ-
ent of nominal variables (the price level), even
in the long run.
36
35
For a good example of the growing skepticism about the
role of monetary policy in stabilization and the acceptance
of the “New Inflation” theory see The Joint Economic Com-
mittee Staff Report on Employment, Growth and Price
Levels (Washington, 1959).
See the review by H. P. Minsky, “Employment, Growth
and Price Levels: A Review Article,” The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, February 1961, and the analysis of
the inflation theory in the “Staff Report,” in C. Habemler, op.
cit. See also C. C. Kaufman, “Current Issues in Monetary
Economics and Policy: A Review,” op. cit., for a discussion
of the monetary issues.
~~Although the trade-off function between unemployment and
inflation is widely accepted, its interpretation does pose
several questions for inflation theory: Are the trade-off
estimates, interpreted as long-run steady-state relations,
(6) FInally, some economists have recently attempted
to analyze inflation in terms of a disequilibrium
model — thus generalizing the earlier Keynesian
wage-push theory to cover sellers’ inflation and
administered (non-equilibrium) prices. In their
model actual prices, and especially wage rates,
are very often somewhere between the demand
and supply price, and do not, therefore, satisfy
either the demand function or the supply func-
tion; market prices and wages are detennined in
their view by market power and relative bargain-
ing strength. In this model it is possible to have
both buyers’ and sellers’ inflation.37
This review of inflation theory illustrates the pro-
liferation of non-monetary price level and cost infla-
tion theories since the end of World War II, stressing
(a) autonomous increases in factor costs, (b) shifts
in demand, (c) administered prices and market
power, (d) the trade-off function between unem-
ployment and price level changes, and (e) mar-
kets in disequilibrium. These “new inflation” theories
reflect a growing consensus among income-expenditure
theorists throughoutthis period thatmonetaryvariables
are not the causal, independent, or active factors
affecting output, employment, or prices. The wide-
spread acceptance of these new inflation theories,
both in the academic world and in business circles,
seemed to vindicate the monetary views of the in-
consistent with our accumulated experience with inflation?
Are the trade-off estimates, which assume a lonE learning
period, consistent with our theories of anticipated inflations
and expectational behavior? Does the trade-off analysis
suggest any role for monetary policy in avoiding or in
combating inflation by shifting the trade-off function? And
is such a role consistent with the growing volume of
empirical studies of the monetary sector?
The Samuelson and Solow article developing the trade-
off analysis by utilizing the Phillips Curve is given in
P. Samuelson and R. Solow, “Analytical Aspects of Anti-
Inflation Policy,” American Economic Review, May 1960 and
empirical estimates of the Phillips Curve and the trade-off
function are presented in George L. Perry, Unemployment,
Money Wage Rates, and Inflation (Cambridge: The M.I.T.
Press, 1966); Ronald C. Bodkin, The Wage-Price-Produc-
tivity Nexus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1966); and Roger W. Spencer, “The Relation Be-
tween Prices and Employment: Two Views, in the March
1969 issue of this Review. See the discussion of Phillips
Curves and trade-off functions in A. Burns and P. Samuel-
son, Full Employment, Guideposts and Economic Stability
(Washington, 1967); and Solow’s paper, “Recent Contro-
versy on the Theory of Inflation: An Eclectic View,” in
S. %V, Rousseas, op. cit.; see C. Haberler, “Stability Growth
and Inflation, a chapter in a forthcoming volume dealin
with these issues, and D. Fand, “On Phfflips Curves an
Trade-off Functions,” a paper presented to the Canadian
Economics Association meetings, Toronto, Canada, June 5,
1969 for a discussion of the Phillips (U,W) function, and
its relation to the Samuelson-Solow (U,I) trade-off function.
37
For a statement of this disequilibrium model see A. P.
Lemer, On Generalizing the General Theory,” American
Economic Review, March 1960. For a different interpreta-
tion, see A. Leijonhufvud, op. cit.
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come-expenditure theorists, and helped explain the
experiments — in the United States and in Western
Europe — with new inflation weapons such as incomes
policies, wage-price guideposts, indicative planning
and other elements of supply management.
Nevertheless, the failure to introduce monetary
variables in the analysis of the price level and in
inflation theory does seem strange. Whatever rele-
vance or validity these non-monetary theories may
have had in explaining, or in providing, effective
policies for coping with the creeping inflation of the
1950’s, they are clearly inappropriate for the inflation
of the 1960’s. A credible explanation of our recent
inflation surely must take account of excess demand
and the high rates of monetary expansion since 1965.
Whether or not this rate of monetary expansion was
inevitable, given the Vietnam War, it surely played
a major and substantial role in our recent inflation.
The tendency to exclude any direct influence of
money on prices and to stress real (non-monetary)
factors in explaining the absolute price level has gen-
erated an intellectual climate in which it is easy to
neglect the behavior of the monetary aggregates. And
when income-expenditure theorists highlight the effect
of monetary policy on interest rates, they necessarily
minimize the effect on prices, for this is implicit in al-
lowing real balances to behave as if they were a policy
variable. In consequence, when they were faced with
the need to explain the creeping inflation and price
level movements of the 1950’s, they sought to locate the
cause among the aggregate supply variables such as
wage-push, markups, sellers’ inflation, or in demand
shifts. Admittedly, this inflation theory was not de-
signed to serve as the analytical model for analyzing
a demand inflation such as that we have experienced
since the Vietnam escalation in 1965. Nevertheless,
the stressing of real factors in the theory of the price
level has made it difficult for many income-expenditure
theorists to see the relevance of the substantial growth
in the money stock in the recent inflation, even while
freely conceding that it is a classical demand inflation.
Our experience since 1965 suggests that we direct oar
attention to the money stock and its effect on aggregate
demand and prices. It also suggests that the emphasis
given to real factors in explaining the post-1965 infla-
tion and to discretionary fiscal policy for coping with
it, and the relative neglect of the monetary aggre-
gates, is an inheritance from the past that needs to
be re-examined.38
385ee D. Fand, “The Chain Reaction-Original Sin (CROS)
Theory of Inflation,” op. cit.; “A Monetary Interpretation of
the Post-1965 Inflation in the United States,” op. cit.; and
“Keynesian Monetary Theories, Stahilization Policy, and the
Recent Inflation,” op. cit.
Fiscal Policy Assumptions
and Related Multipliers
The theory of fiscal policy highlights the direct
income-generating effects of government deficits and
surpluses and the stabilization aspects of the cumula-
tive multiplier expansion process; but the theory often
ignores the interest rate or capital market effects, and
invariably abstracts from any associated money stock
effects. The simplest presentation may be summarized
as follows: an increase in government spending is
viewed as a direct demand for goods and services;
reductions in tax rates are viewed as directly affecting
consumer spending, investment, andaggregate demand;
and the initial increase in spending is viewed as setting
off a cumulative expansion as given by the multiplier
process.39 More advanced discussions go beyond the
45°diagram, introduce the Hicksian IS-LM analysis
to account for the capital market effects of changes in
fiscal policy; but even this more advanced analysis
typically abstracts from the money creation aspects
that may be associated with a cumulative expansion.
A widely quoted statement describing the “Work-
ings of the Multiplier” in the Economic Report of the
President for 1963 illustrates this tendency to omit
the capital market and money creation aspects.4°
The direct income-generating effects of the deficit are
stressed, but no indication is given whether the rise
in income requires stable interest rates, an elastic
monetary policy, or a deficit financed through the
banking system. Thus, the case for a discretionary
tax cut and a reduction in the full-employment surr
plus, as presented by the Council of Economic Ad-
visers (CEA) in 1963, does not bring in any explicit
discussion of the method in which the deficit is fi-
nanced. Their position is stated as follows:
Tax reduction will directly increase the disposable
income and purchasing power of consumers and
business, strengthen incentives and expectations,
and raise the net returns on new capital investment.
This will lead to initial increases in private con-
sumption and investment expenditures. These in-
39The volume of readings, American Fiscal Policy: Experi-
ment for Prosperity (Prentice-Hall, 1967), edited by
L. Thumow, is a good example. With very few exceptions, the
individual papers either abstract from, or ignore, monetary
factors, and do not cite any empirical evidence to justify
the strategic role assigned to discretionary changes in the
full-employment surplus. It appears that such justification
was not felt necessary, because the very substantial growth
in CNP since 1964 was widely interpreted as the result of
the 1964 tax cut and reduction in the full-employment
surplus. 40See the section, “Workings of the Multiplier” in the Eco-
nomic Report of the President for 1963, This is reprinted in
A. M. Okun (ed), The Battle Against Unemployment
(Norton, 1965), pp. 88-97.
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creases in spending will set off a cumulative expan-
sion, generating further increases in consumption
and investment spending and a general rise in pro-
duction, income and employment.
The analysis of the 1964 tax cut presented by Arthur
Okun in 1965 explicitly justifies the omission of any
capital market or monetary effects,41 Although Okun
accepts the view that significant changes in the cost or
availability of credit would have an important influence
on business investment, he does not make allowance
for these factors in his quantitative estimates of the
multiplier. He rationalizes his procedure as follows:
in practice, dealing with the period of the last
year and a half, I cannot believe that the omiss!on
of monetary variables can make a serious differ-
ence. By any measure of interest rates or credit
conditions I know, there have been no significant
monetary changes that would have either stimulated
or restrained investment to a major degree.
He does concede that “the maintenance of stable in-
terest rates and stable credit conditions requires mone-
tary action” and that at least to this extent, “monetary
policies have made a major contribution to the ad-
vance.” But in his view, “that contribution is appro-
priately viewed as permissive rather than causal,”
Okun’s analysis, presented in August 1965, attributing
the GNP expansion to the tax-cut multiplier, was a
strict fiscal policy interpretation, in contrast to other
(monetary and eclectic) interpretations that were
presented at that time.42 His analysis was not modi-
fied when it was published in 1968.~~
If the fiscal approach, with its multiplier analysis,
emphasizes the deficit or surplus and relegates both
the interest rate and the money creation aspects to a
~‘Okun’s analysis of the 1964 tax cut was presented at the
1965 meetings of the American Statistical Association. His
paper, “Measuring the Impact of the 1964 Tax Reduction
has been published in W. Heller (ed), Perspectives on
Economic Growth, op. cit., pp. 25-51.
42See D. I. Fund, “Three Views on the Current Expansion” in
C. Horwich (ed), Monetary Process and Policy: A Sympo-
sium (Irwin, 1967), analyzing the views of the fiscal pro-
ponents, the monetary proponents, and those who take an
eclectic position. See also A. F. Burns, The Management of
Prosperity (Columbia University Press, 1966); M. Friedman,
“The Monetary Studies of the National Bureau,” reprinted
as Chapter 12 in his The Optimum Quantity of Money,
pp. 261-284; B. Sprinkel, “An Evaluation of Recent Federal
Reserve Policy” in the Financial Analysts Journal, August
1965; and C. Morrison, “The Influence of Money on Eco-
nomic Activity,” in the 1965 Proceedings volume of the
American Statistical Association.
~~Okun, in a note added in June 1967 to his 1965 analysis
of the tax cut, does concede that “any analysis of fiscal
impact that covered the more recent period could no longer
treat monetary policy as a passive supporting force, nor
could it continue to ignore the influence of higher levels of
aggregate demand on prices.” See W. W. Heller (ed), op.
cit., pp. 27-28.
secondary role, the monetary approach emphasizes
the money stock effects. To the monetarist, the im-
pact of fiscal actions will depend crucially on how
the government deficit is financed: expenditures fi-
nanced either by taxing or borrowing involve a trans-
fer of resources (from the public to the government),
with both interest rates and wealth effects on private
portfolios, but the net effect of a temporary change
in fiscal policy on spending may be ambiguous. Simi-
larly, the effect of a reduction in taxes on private
demand, financed through borrowing, will depend on
(1) the extent to which it is viewed as a permanent,
or temporary, tax cut, and (2) its effect on market
interest rates. Accordingly, the direct income-generat-
ing effects of a deficit — the pure fiscal effect — may
be quite small and uncertain. On the other hand, if
the deficit is financed through money creation by the
banking system — if the deficit is monetized —the ef-
fect is unambiguously expansionary.
Many income theorists recognized that the multi-
plier analysis based on the 45° diagram was inade-
quate, and modified their analysis to take account of
interest rate effects through the Hicksian IS-LM frame-
work. But even this modification, while a step in the
right direction, does not really make allowance for
the money creation aspects of defleits. What is needed
is a macroeconomic model, where the monetary ef-
fects of the deficit are taken up by introducing an
explicit government budget restraint. Recent studies
along these lines suggest that many of the standard
propositions about the multiplier need to be revised.~~
Aside from these theoretical reasons, the need to
separate out the monetary effects from the fiscal ef-
fects has been highlighted by the recent Andersen-
Jordan study, testing the relative effectiveness of
monetary and fiscal actions in stabilization.45 Their re-
44
See L. S. Ritter, “Some Monetary Aspects of Multiplier
Theory and Fiscal Policy,” Review of Economic Studies,
February 1956; C. Christ, “A Simple Macroeconomic Model
with a Government Budget Restraint,” Journal of Political
Economy, January 1968; and J. M. Culbertson, Macroeco-
nomic Theory and Stabilization Policy (McGraw-Hill, 1968),
pp. 462-464.
See also K. M. Carlson and D. S. Kamnosky, “The In-
fluence of Fiscal and Monetary Actions on Aggregate De-
mand: A Quantitative Appraisal,” Working Paper No. 4,
March 1969, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; and K. M.
Carlson, “Monetary and Fiscal Actions in Macroeconomic
Models: A Balance Sheet Analysis,” an unpublished manu-
script, for an interesting attempt to define and estimate the
monetary effects of fiscal policy actions.
~
5
The Andersen-Jordan results are presented in “Monetary
and Fiscal Actions: A Test of their Relative Importance in
Stabilization,” op. cit. See also the Comments ot DeLeeuw
and Icalchbrenner, and the Reply by Andersen and Jordan,
op. cit. and R. G. Davis, “How Much Does Money Matter:
A Loolc at Some Recent Evidence,” op. cit.; the earlier
study by M. Friedman and D. Meiselman on “The Relative
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suits, while preliminary and subject to further testing,
do suggest that the theory of fiscal policy (in the
income-expenditure framework), with its emphasis on
discretionary changes in the full-employment surplus as
the key stabilization instrument, may be incorrect or
only partially correct. Thcir findings also suggest that
the tax and expenditure multipliers, as estimated in
many incomemodels, tend to confound a ceteris paribus
fiscal action (excluding money stock efFects), with a
mutatis mutandis fiscal action (incorporating both
monetary and fiscal effects).
The need to revise the standard multiplier theory
and to develop mnorc discriminating empirical tests
of the relative effectiveness of mnonetary and fiscal
actions is recognized even among fiscal policy advo-
cates. There is a significant mnodific-ation of the
multiplier theory in the Economic Report of the
President for 1969, stressing two points in particular:
(1) “the results of this multiplier process are affected
by the amount of unused resources available in the
economy”; and (2) monetary policy does affect the
magnitude of the multiplier:
Developments in financial markets may influence
the magnitude of the multiplier. Increases in de-
mands for goods and services will tend to enlarge
credit demands. Unless monetary policy permits
supplies of funds to expand correspondingly, in-
terest rates will rise and credit will become less
readily available. In that event, some offsetting re-
duction is likely to take place in residential con-
struction and other credit-sensitive expenditures.
Generally this will be a partial offset, varying ac-
cording to how much the supply of credit is per-
mitted to expand.4°
There is therefore a growing consensus that multi-
plier theory needs to separate out the monetary ef-
fects from the pure fiscal effects, in order to develop
meaningful tests of the relative contribution of mone-
tary and fiscal policy in stabilization. In particular,
we need to define and measure monetary variables
so as to separate out exogenous changes in the money
stock, resulting from actions taken by the monetary
authorities — from endogenous money stock changes
— resulting from shifts in the demand for money, so
as to remove the identification problem in a manner
that is acceptable to the income-expenditure theorists.
We also need to define a pure ceteris paribus fiscal
Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment Multi-
plier in the United States, 1897-1958” in Stabilization Poli-
cies (Prentice Hall, 1963), and the subsequent discussion
of this study by F, Modigliani and A. Ando, and by
T. Mayer and M. DePrano in American Economic Review,
September 1963.
46See The Economic Report of the President for 1969, p. 72.
action with restrictions on the growth rate for the
monetary aggregates that is acceptable to the mone-
tarists. A revision of multiplier theory along these
lines \vould enable us to distinguish analytically, and
estimate, ceteris parthus fiscal and monetary multi-
pliers, and thus bridge some of the gap between the
income-expenditure theory and the quantity theory.
But it requires that we find an acceptable method to
separate out endogenous and exogenous changes in
the money stock, and to estimate empirically the
money stock effects of deficits and surpluses.
Fiscal deficits are obviously often associated with,
if not directly responsible for, substantial increases in
the monetary aggregates. Our recent experience re-
minds us once again that a fiscal deficit, financed by
the banking system, will tend to accelerate the growth
in the money stock; while a fiscal surplus, whether
impounded or used to retire debt, \vill tend to deceler-
ate the money stock growth. And if the fiscal deficit
is financed in part through accelerated monetary
expansion, as was the case since the Vietnam escala-
tion in 1965, the growth in GNP reflects the combined
effects of fiscal and monetary action.
Monetary policy, measured in terms of the money
stock, typically changes in the same direction as fiscal
policy. Accordingly, what we observe in most periods
(like the 1964 tax cut) is the effect of a combined
action incorporating both monetary and fiscal elements.
It is therefore fortunate for the development of sta-
bilization theory that they were working in opposite
directions on two occasions in recent years — thus
providing an interesting test case. In 1966 a sharp
increase in the deficit was matched by a very substan-
tial tightening in monetary policy; and the crunch in
the latter half of 1966 and the mini-recession in early
1967 clearly demonstrate the power of monetary pol-
icy. Similarly in 1968, the very substantial increase in
the full-employment surplus enacted in the June 1968
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act (and giving
rise to widespread fear of overkill ) was apparently
offset by the preceding and subsequent growth in
the monetary aggregates. In these cases, the mone-
tary forces seem to have been the stronger ones, not
relatively minor (or permissive) factors that can only
accommodate (or validate) fiscal policy actions. Hence
there has been renewed interest in their relative con-
tribution to stabilization.
This, then, brings us to our first question: How do
we define the ceteris paribus fiscal action if monetary
policy and fiscal policy often move in the same three-
tion? The income-expenditure theorists, who definethis
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as a fiscal action with interest rates held
constant, are calibrating monetary policy in
a manner which is consistent with their view
of the transmission mechanism. On this defi-
nition, a ceteris paribus fiscal deficit may re-
quire a very substantial increase in the stock
of money, and appears to the monetarist as a
mutatis mutandis effect. To the monetarist, a
ceteris paribas deficit requires a given money
stock growth rate, which may lead to a rise
in the interest rate; and to fiscal policy advo-
cates, this appears as an offsetting action
since the risc in interest rates (which they
use to calibrate the posture of monetary
policy) is restrictive and tends to offset the
income-generating effects of the deficit. The
ceteris paribas effect for deficits or surpluses,
as defined by the monetarist , will necessarily
differ from the definitionadopted by the fiscal
policy advocates. This point is illustrated in
a recent study of monetary and fiscal in-
fluences on economic- activity for the period
1919-69.~~ The evidence sunimarized in Table
I indicates that when we regress economic
activity on fiscal policy, the relation is fairly
good. If, however, we include a monetary
aggregate variable in the regression, we find, as shown
in Table II, that the ceteris paribus fiscal effect, as
defined by the monetarist, is either statistically insig-
nificant or has the wrong sign. The evidence sum-
marized in Tables I and II illustrates the problem of
separating out the fiscal effect from the effect due to
the monetary aggregate.
This difference in concepts helps explain the exist-
ence of a fairly pronounced communications gap.
What a monetarist regards as a ceteris paribus deficit
may entail a rise in interest rates, and wifi therefore
appear as an offsetting action to the fiscal advocate;
what a fiscal advocate regards as a ceteris pan bus fiscal
effect may entail accelerated growth in the money
stock, and will therefore appear as a mutatis mutandis
monetary effect to the monetarist. This applies es-
pecially to the analysis of the 1964 tax cut.
The money stock effects of deficits and surpluses
need to be quantified if we are to obtain a realistic
formulation of the government budget restraint. Once
this is done we may be able to estimate the differen-
tial effects of non-monetized and monetized deficits,
and obtain acceptable estimates of fiscal multipliers —
for the ceteris paribas and for the mutatis mutandis
cases. We would also like to derive such estimates
for the monetarist who calibrates monetary actions in
~7Miehael Keran, ~Monetary and Fiscal Influences on Eco-
nomic Activity — The Historical Evidence in the November
1969 issue of this Review.
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Table II
INDICATORS OF MONETARY CAM) AND FISCAL (AE)
INFLUENCES ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (AY)
AY = ~u -+~a1 AM -;- a AE
(Quarterly First Differences — Billions of Dotlars)
Time Periods Lags~ or or AM az AE
(sum) (sum) D-W
11/1919 — /69 1-6 1.92 2.89 .07 .32
(2.34) (4.31) (.28) 1.15
11/1919.— 11,29 t-3 .36 5.62 ‘‘ .35
(.51) (3.16) 1.58
111/1929 .—.- 11.39 I 5 .51 5.40 7.97 .39
(.54) (3.41) (1.95) 1.86
111:1939. — IV/46 1.5 6.32 1.21 .35 .66
(1.39) (.59) (.81) 1.60
/1947 — IV/52 f-la 3.65 13.82 3.37 .72
(.84) (3.51) (4.12) 2.74
1/1953 — 1/69 1-4 1.42 8.85 —-.84 .47
(.74) (4.70) (1.07) 1.71
Note Regre~~ion cns’ffic’ient., arw the top figures; their statiatic~appear below
rich t’,.t’ tbere,.s. Erci,,ss,! by parcHthe. .~. 1t~is ti,. per rent C, I vpriation
the Icrundent uu’rnl,Ic’ wh ch is extrialneci by varjarit’ISP in tlit’ odej’t’!,Uent
yarsahi.’. U. \\ is th.’ Pu !~1o I,—watson ‘tiLts, tic.
Lags are selt’cto,I on tIre beats or minimum standard error, s~justedfor degrees
of Ireedo,n.
l’i%CiLl ariable nns Ittsi 1. i 1919. ~9 I,neau. e tincr,’s.’r, I ftc’ standar,i error
tb, cstisn’i C.
Table I
IMPACT OF FISCAL INFLUENCES (AEI
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (AY)
= f0 -f f1 AE
(First Differences — Billions of Dollars)
tags fir f~AE (sum) R
2
/D-W
11/1919 .-— 1/1969 t-6 3.83 .81 .13
(5.16) (3.01) .96
11/1919—11/1929 1-7 1.73 3.27 .41
(2.44) (2.78) 1.58
111/1929 — 11/1939 1-10 —-3.45 18.28 .14
(225) (2.18) 1.49
111/1939 — IV/ 1946 1-4 4.29 .53 .61
(2.91) (2.11) 1.43
l/1947—IV/1952 1.4 9.38 1.49 .09
(3.91) (1.76) .81
I’ 1953—11/1969 1-3 6.08 1.71 .08
(2 95) (2.15) 1.13
Not, : Itrgrc.teion c,,c’ffrci. rite an, the tup figurt, their val.jes
apj ear below curls cooffich at, curiae, d by parentlr a., p it.~
I the percent uI variation, In the dependc-nt variable which
is cxi lamed by variations in the indopendant variable. D-W is
the Durbin-Wateon statistic.
Sekcted on the basis of minimum standard errcr of estimatt’,
adjusted for degrees of freeclons.
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terms of the money stock growth, and for the fiscal
advocates who calibrate monetary policy in termns of
interest rates. Once this is done, we may be able to
translate the results obtained in these two frame-
works. This should help bridge the communication
gap, and it may also help reconcile the two opposing
points of view.48
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed four issues in
monetary theory which seem central to many of the
recent discussions and debates concerning monetary
policy. The first issue is the extemit to which the cen-
tral bank can control the nominal money stock. This
issue has been raised by those who find it more na-
tural to formulate Federal Reserve policy in tenns of
money market and instrument variables, by those
who follow the interest rate transmission mechanism
specified by the income-expenditure theory and prefer
an interest rate criterion for policy making, and by
those who believe that the money stock is, in part, an
endogenous variable and therefore question whether
it can serve as an indicator or target variable. We have
tried to formulate these different viewpoints in terms
of a money supply function, and reported results of
empirical tests which compared the short-run money
supply functions (excluding feedbacks from the real
sector) with a longer-run, reduced form money supply
function (allowing for feedbacks). Our preliminary
findings seem to suggest that the central bank has
sufficient control of the money stock to make itconform
to a given set of guidelines, but that its control may
be weaker (and less precise), the shorter the time
period available to achieve a given objective. This
would suggest that the degree of precision expected
of the monetary authorities is not independent of the
time period that they have to achieve the policy
guidelines.
48
A technique that enabled us to separate out exogenous
changes in the money stock due to monetary policy from
endogenous changes induced by the real sector would
also enable us to estimate a ceteris paribus fiscal action in
terms of exogenous money stock behavior. This approach
would, in principle, be acceptable to the fiscal advocates.
See K. M. Carbon and D. S. Karnosky, op. cit.
The full-employment surplus (om deficit) is generally
accepted as the best measure of fiscal policy, in preference
to the actual surplus (or deficit), which is affected by the
level of activity and behaves therefore more nearly like an
endogenous variable. But the full-employment surplus is
available only for the income and product budget and is
tied to an income-expenditure framework. It may be de-
sirable to experiment with ‘similar” concepts (separating
out endogenous effects) for the cash budget and the new,
and comprehensive, liquidity budget, to determine which
of these budgets provides the most useful measure of fiscal
policy.
The second question that we have explored is the
relation between nominal and real quantities in the
income-expenditure theory and modem quantity
theory. The stabilization difficulties that we have ex-
perienced in the last several years may be related to
two propositions about money which have been
widely accepted in many of the income models. These
are: (1) that the authorities can influence real balances
if they can control nominal balances; and (2) that
the authorities can influence real interest rates (and
rates of return) by operations which change nominal
market rates. Both of these propositions may lead to
serious policy errors when applied to a high-pressure
economy such as the United States in the post-1965
period.
The third topic that we have considered is various
theories of the price level and related frameworks for
analyzing inflation. We find that there has been
a tendency since World War II to divorce money
from prices, to stress real factors in explaining the
absolute price level, and to neglect even substantial
movements in the monetary aggregates. Moreover,
when income theorists highlight the short-run effect
of money on interest rates — the liquidity effect — and
treat it as a permanent effect, they necessarily mini~
mize the effect on prices. This corresponds to treating
real balances as if it were a variable that could be
influenced by the monetary authorities. Having ruled
out any direct link between money and prices, income
theorists necessarily explain the post-1965 rise in the
price level by bringing in aggregate supply variables,
other real sector developments, Vietnam escalation,
and inappropriate fiscal policy, but continue to ab-
stract from the very substantial growth in the money
stock and other monetary aggregates.
The fourth problem that we have considered is that
of defining cetenis panibus and mutatis mutandis fiscal
effects. A cetenis panibus fiscal deficit — holding money
stock growth constant — allows interest rates to rise
and will therefore appear as an offsetting action to
a fiscal advocate; while a cetenis paribus fiscal deficit —
holding interest rates constant — allows money stock
growth rates to increase, and appears as a mutatis
mutandis effect to the monetanist. These concepts need
to be defined both for the monetarists and the fiscal
advocates, in order to translate the results obtained in
the two frameworks. This may help bridge some of the
communications gap in stabilization theory, and also
help reconcile the two points of view.
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